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Abstract:  
Many studies have correlated dispositional reactance scales with other self-report scales, but no experiments 
have tested whether ―trait reactance‖ replicates ―state reactance‖ effects. Using a conventional reactance 
paradigm, an experiment examined the construct validity of dispositional reactance. College students (n = 78) 
read a communication that did or did not threaten their freedom to disagree, and then they reported their 
agreement. Threatening attitudinal freedom increased disagreement, thus replicating many reactance 
experiments. Dispositional reactance interacted with threats to freedom, but in a manner contrary to the 
construct’s predictions—―high reactance‖ people were more likely to agree with a pushy, coercive message. 
The findings question the construct validity of dispositional reactance. 




After nearly 40 years, reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) remains one of social psychology’s major theories of 
resistance to social influence (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Reactance theory assumes that people feel free to do 
certain things. When these perceived freedoms are threatened, people are motivated to restore them. One way to 
restore a threatened freedom is to exercise the freedom. People thus choose forbidden decision options, seek 
censored material, and show ―boomerang effects‖ in response to coercive messages (Brehm and Brehm, 1981 
and Wicklund, 1974). 
 
The study of reactance in social psychology emphasizes situational factors that affect reactance. As Brehm and 
Brehm (1981) noted, reactance theory comes from a research tradition that usually manipulates variables and 
ignores individual-differences. Researchers in clinical and personality psychology, however, eventually 
considered whether state reactance had a trait analog (Dowd et al., 1991, Merz, 1983 and Shoham et al., 2004). 
This led to the development of scales to measure individual-differences in reactance. An impetus for studying 
dispositional reactance was an interest in identifying people who were likely to resist complying with 
psychotherapy (Dowd, 1999), although most of the research has been with non-clinical samples. 
 
A substantial literature on dispositional reactance has accumulated over the last 15 years (see Shoham et al., 
2004, for a review). Thus far, research on dispositional reactance sorts into two categories. Studies in the first 
category assess the psychometric properties of self-report scales of dispositional reactance. The three prominent 
scales are the Hong Psychological Reactance Scale (Hong, 1992, Hong and Faedda, 1996, Hong and Page, 1989 
and Thomas et al., 2001), the Therapeutic Reactance Scale (Buboltz et al., 2002 and Dowd et al., 1991), and the 
Questionnaire for the Measurement of Psychological Reactance (Hong and Ostini, 1989, Merz, 1983 and 
Tucker and Byers, 1987). Studies in the second category correlate these scales with other self-report measures 
of individual-differences, such as vocational interests (Buboltz, Woller, & Pepper, 1999), personality types 
(Buboltz et al., 2003), and traits such as dominance, aggressiveness, and defensiveness (Dowd and Wallbrown, 
1993 and Dowd et al., 1994), in the hopes of creating a nomological net that illuminates the construct’s central 
features. 
 
Research to date informs the validity of trait reactance, but it is nevertheless indirect evidence. Models of 
dispositional reactance are explicitly tied to the major constructs and predictions from Brehm’s (1966) theory of 
reactance. As a ―trait‖ counterpart to ―state reactance,‖ dispositional reactance should replicate conventional, 
situational reactance effects. Thus far, no experiments have examined whether dispositional reactance actually 
predicts reactance, such as disagreement in response to threats to freedom. This is unfortunate—such tests are 
the most direct and decisive tests of construct validity. Because of the lack of direct evidence that trait reactance 
resembled state reactance, Shoham et al. (2004) concluded ―we have serious doubts regarding the validity of 
existing measures as indicators of trait reactance‖ (p. 173). 
 
The present experiment examined the construct validity of dispositional reactance by assessing its role in classic 
reactance effects. Reactance theory is best-known for its predictions regarding attitudes and persuasion. Many 
experiments find that threats to attitudinal freedom—the freedom to hold a particular position on an issue—
create reactance. Threatening a person’s freedom to disagree with a message creates a boomerang effect, in 
which the person moves away from the position advocated in the message (Carver, 1977, Wicklund and Brehm, 
1968, Worchel and Brehm, 1970 and Wright, 1986). A prototypical reactance paradigm was chosen to give an 
incisive view of the validity of dispositional reactance—if it does not replicate a central prediction of reactance 
theory, then it would appear not to be a trait version of state reactance. 
 
In the present experiment, people read a message that did or did not threaten their freedom to disagree. Their 
agreement with the message and their perceptions of threat were then measured. The predictions for between-
condition effects are clear—people in the high threat group should disagree more than people in the low threat 
group, and this difference should stem from differences in the perception of threat. Two predictions can be 
advanced for dispositional reactance. One prediction is a main effect—people high in reactance should disagree 
more than people low in reactance, regardless of the level of threat. A second prediction is an interaction with 
threat—people high in reactance should disagree the most when their freedom is explicitly threatened. 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants and design 
A total of 78 people—54 women, 24 men—enrolled in General Psychology at the University of North Carolina 
at Greensboro (UNCG) participated as part of a research option. Each person was randomly assigned to one of 
two between-subject conditions: Low Threat or High Threat. 
 
2.2. Procedure 
People participated in groups of 4–8; the participants did not communicate with each other. The experiment was 
ostensibly a survey of ―how different aspects of personality relate to people’s attitudes‖ as well as ―what people 
think about other people’s opinions‖. People expected to complete a brief personality scale, read an essay 
written by another student, and then note their impressions and reactions. 
 
2.2.1. Measurement of reactance 
The first page of the questionnaire contained the Hong Psychological Reactance Scale (Hong, 1992 and Hong 
and Page, 1989). This scale has better psychometric properties than some other scales (see Dowd and 
Wallbrown, 1993, Hong and Ostini, 1989, Merz, 1983, Thomas et al., 2001 and Tucker and Byers, 1987), and it 
was intended for use with normal populations (cf. Dowd et al., 1991). This study used the 11-item refined 
version developed and recommended by Hong and Faedda (1996). Items include ―I become angry when my 
freedom of choice is restricted‖ and ―I resist the attempts of others to influence me‖. The scale was flanked by 
filler items to divert attention from the study’s true purpose (e.g., ―I probably procrastinate more than other 
people‖). People responded using 7-point scales (endpoints: strongly disagree, strongly agree). Only the scale’s 
total score was analyzed because recent research (Thomas et al., 2001) questions the factorial validity of its four 
subscales. 
 
2.2.2. Manipulation of threat to freedom 
After the measure of reactance, people completed ―a survey of impressions of other people’s opinions‖. The 
instructions said that approximately 50 students had written short essays about their opinions related to 
university issues. The researchers now wanted to get other people’s impressions and reactions to the 50 essays. 
In the low threat condition, people read a 130-word essay advocating for the addition of a major in advertising. 
The author suggested that adding an advertising major would expand choices for students and offer more job 
opportunities for graduates. In the high threat condition, coercive statements were added to the essay. The 
author began the essay by noting ―Here are my reasons for wanting a major in advertising at UNCG. They’re 
good reasons, so I know you completely agree with all of them. Because when you think about it you are really 
forced to agree with me because this is a universal student issue‖. 
 
This essay had been developed in previous research on reactance (Silvia, 2005 and Silvia, in press). Adding 
coercive statements to a message is one of the most widely-used manipulations in reactance research (Brehm & 
Brehm, 1981). The specific threatening statements were based on past experiments (Carver, 1977, Snyder and 
Wicklund, 1976 and Wicklund and Brehm, 1968). A pro-attitudinal message (i.e., one congruent with the 
participants’ attitudes) was used to maximize reactance effects. Threats create more reactance when people 
agree with the position advocated in the message (Worchel and Brehm, 1970 and Wright, 1986). When people 
disagree, the mere fact of disagreement establishes their freedom to hold a contrary attitude and thus reduces 
reactance (Brehm and Brehm, 1981 and Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). 
 
2.2.3. Measurement of agreement and perceived threat 
Following the essay, people completed measures of agreement with the communicator and a manipulation 
check of the level of threat in the essay. Agreement was measured with two items: How much do you agree 
with the author? and How similar is your attitude to the author’s attitude? Perceived threat was measured with 
four items: The author was pressuring me to agree with him/her; The author was trying too hard to persuade me; 
The author was trying to keep me from making up my own mind about the topic; and The author was pushy. 
People responded using 7-point scales (endpoints: not at all, very much). The participants were then debriefed. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Data reduction 
Responses to the 11 items in the Hong Psychological Reactance Scale were averaged to form an overall 
reactance score. The scale’s scores were modest in reliability (α = .58; cf. Thomas et al., 2001). Responses to 
the two agreement items (α = .83) and the four perceived threat items (α = .96) were averaged as well. Gender 
did not predict dispositional reactance (F < 1) or participate in any significant effects. 
 
3.2. Replication of reactance effects 
Before evaluating dispositional reactance, I examined whether the basic reactance effect appeared. Did people 
agree less when the communicator threatened their attitudinal freedom? The manipulation check of perceived 
threat suggested that the manipulation was successful, t(76) = 6.41, p < .001. As expected, people in the high 
threat condition (M = 5.06, SD = 1.79) viewed the communicator as more threatening to their freedom, relative 
to people in the low threat condition (M = 2.75, SD = 1.36). Furthermore, the manipulation of threat caused a 
boomerang effect, t(76) = 3.64, p < .001. People in the high threat condition agreed less with the communicator 
(M = 4.06, SD = 1.18), relative to people in the low threat condition (M = 5.00, SD = 1.09). The classic 
reactance effect was thus nicely replicated. 
 
3.3. Dispositional reactance and persuasion 
To see if dispositional reactance moderated the effects of threats to freedom on persuasion, a multiple 
regression analysis estimated the interaction between dispositional reactance and the manipulation of threat. 
Reactance scores were centered prior to analysis (Judd & McClelland, 1989). The main effects of threat and 
dispositional reactance were entered in the first step (R
2
 = .150); the interaction between threat and dispositional 
reactance was entered in the second step (R
2
 = .237, Δ = .087). The interaction significantly increased the 
variance explained by the model, F(1, 74) = 8.46, p < .005. The analyses indicated a significant main effect of 
threat, β = −.422, p < .001, no main effect of dispositional reactance, β = .045, and a significant interaction, 
β = .297, p < .005. To appraise the shape of this interaction, the relationship between reactance and agreement 
was analyzed at each level of threat (Myers & Well, 2003). The interaction pattern, estimated from the 
regression equation, is displayed in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Estimated effects of threat to freedom and dispositional reactance on agreement. 
 
When threat was low, reactance had a marginal, negative relation to agreement, β = −.284, p < .079. Although 
marginal, this effect is consistent with the construct of dispositional reactance—people higher in reactance 
tended to agree less. When threat was high, however, reactance had a significant, positive relation to agreement, 
β = .353, p < .028. People higher in reactance agreed more, relative to people lower in reactance. This finding is 
inconsistent with the validity of dispositional reactance—people higher in reactance, by the definition of the 
construct, should not be more easily persuaded. 
 
4. Discussion 
After years of popularity in social psychology, the concept of reactance has gained attention in the study of 
individual-differences (Buboltz et al., 2002 and Thomas et al., 2001). Despite the recent interest in dispositional 
reactance, research has not yet conducted experiments that examine whether ―reactant people‖ show reactance. 
As a trait defined with reference to ―state‖ reactance, individual-differences in reactance should replicate 
experimental findings. Just as individual-differences in private self-consciousness replicate manipulations of 
self-awareness (Eichstaedt and Silvia, 2003, Silvia and Eichstaedt, 2004 and Silvia et al., 2005), and just as 
individual-differences in need for cognition replicate manipulations of message elaboration (Cacioppo, Petty, & 
Morris, 1983), individual-differences in reactance should replicate manipulations of threats to freedom. For 
instance, reactant people should disagree more in response to threat, show stronger preferences for restricted 
activities, and reassert threatened freedoms. 
 
The present experiment found little support for the validity of dispositional reactance. When a message did not 
threaten freedom, there was marginal effect of reactance—people with high scores on the Hong Psychological 
Reactance Scale tended to disagree more. Although congruent with the construct, one would expect more 
disagreement when a threat is present. When a message contained a threat to freedom, the opposite pattern 
appeared—people scoring low in dispositional reactance disagreed more. Reactant people were more persuaded 
by the pushy, ―hard sell‖ message. In short, only people scoring low on the scale showed the predicted 
reactance effect. The validity of the scale in this case was not merely zero (i.e., a failure to find an effect) but 
was in fact negative (i.e., an effect in the opposite direction). Reconciling this finding with the construct of 
dispositional reactance seems difficult. 
 
Assessing validity is a continuous process—no single study can make definitive claims about the validity of a 
psychological construct. To date, research has correlated self-report reactance scales with other self-report 
measures of individual-differences. A ―nomological net‖ should eventually be cast over behavior and activity 
(Wicklund, 1990). ―Reactant people‖ should show reactance when placed in conventional reactance-inducing 
situations. The findings of the present experiment are surely not the last word, but they offer reasons to be 
skeptical of the validity of dispositional reactance (Shoham et al., 2004). 
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